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Predecisional information distortion in physicians’ diagnostic
judgments: Strengthening a leading hypothesis or weakening its
competitor?
Martine Nurek∗ Olga Kostopoulou† York Hagmayer‡
Abstract
Decision makers have been found to bias their interpretation of incoming information to support an emerging judgment
(predecisional information distortion). This is a robust finding in human judgment, and was recently also established
and measured in physicians’ diagnostic judgments (Kostopoulou et al. 2012). The two studies reported here extend this
work by addressing the constituent modes of distortion in physicians. Specifically, we studied whether and to what extent
physicians distort information to strengthen their leading diagnosis and/or to weaken a competing diagnosis. We used the
“stepwise evolution of preference” method with three clinical scenarios, and measured distortion on separate rating scales,
one for each of the two competing diagnoses per scenario.
In Study 1, distortion in an experimental group was measured against the responses of a separate control group. In Study
2, distortion in a new experimental group was measured against participants’ own, personal responses provided under
control conditions, with the two response conditions separated by a month. The two studies produced consistent results. On
average, we found considerable distortion of information to weaken the trailing diagnosis but little distortion to strengthen
the leading diagnosis. We also found individual differences in the tendency to engage in either mode of distortion. Given
that two recent studies found both modes of distortion in lay preference (Blanchard, Carlson & Meloy, 2014; DeKay,
Miller, Schley & Erford, 2014), we suggest that predecisional information distortion is affected by participant and task
characteristics. Our findings contribute to the growing research on the different modes of predecisional distortion and their
stability to methodological variation.
Keywords: clinical reasoning, diagnostic error, medical decision making, bias, distortion, proleader, antitrailer, personal
need for structure, personal fear of invalidity.
1 Introduction
A wealth of evidence suggests that, over the course
of decision making, the evaluation of new information
can become biased (Russo, Medvec & Meloy, 1996;
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Russo, Meloy & Medvec, 1998; Holyoak & Simon,
1999; Russo, Meloy & Wilks, 2000; Simon, Pham, Le &
Holyoak, 2001; Brownstein, 2003; Simon, Snow & Read,
2004; Carlson, Meloy & Russo, 2006; Russo, Carlson
& Meloy, 2006; DeKay, Patiño-Echeverri, & Fischbeck,
2009; DeKay, Stone & Miller, 2011; Kostopoulou, Russo,
Keenan, Delaney & Douiri, 2012; Miller, DeKay, Stone
& Sorenson, 2013; Blanchard et al., 2014; DeKay et al.,
2014). This “predecisional information distortion” (re-
ferred to simply as “distortion” hereafter) occurs when the
value ascribed to new information is altered to support an
emerging preference or belief (Russo et al., 1998).
Distortion is thought to enable and maintain cogni-
tive coherence, the consistency between new and pro-
cessed information (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon et
al., 2001; Simon et al., 2004; Russo, Carlson, Meloy
& Yong, 2008; Svenson & Jakobsson, 2010; Glöckner,
Betsch & Schindler, 2010). In the context of choice, co-
herent representations could maximize confidence (Simon
et al., 2004), justifiability (Montgomery & Svenson, 1983;
Tyszka, 1998; Svenson & Jakobsson, 2010), cognitive ef-
ficiency (Russo et al., 1996; Russo et al., 1998; Simon et
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al., 2004; Russo et al., 2008) and positive affect (Meloy,
2000; Svenson & Jakobsson, 2010). More broadly, coher-
ent representations allow for identification, prediction and
perhaps exploitation of consistent relationships in the en-
vironment (Simon et al., 2004). Coherence has thus been
thought to shape processes as diverse as visual perception
(Maloney, Martello, Sahm & Spillmann, 2005) and atti-
tude formation (Read & Miller, 1993).
Distortion is widespread and robust. It manifests across
domains (Brownstein, 2003; Miller et al., 2013), in the de-
cisions of lay people (Simon et al., 2004; Levy & Hershey,
2008; DeKay et al., 2014) and professionals alike (Tyszka
& Wielochowski, 1991; Russo et al., 2000; Kostopoulou
et al., 2012). It has been linked to suboptimal decisions
(Russo et al., 2006; Kostopoulou et al., 2012) and appears
to withstand incentives for accuracy (Russo et al., 2000;
Meloy, Russo & Miller, 2006).
Distortion could thus pose a threat to decisions of con-
sequence. A case in point is medical diagnosis, where
information arrives sequentially during the doctor-patient
encounter and must be evaluated in light of competing
diagnostic hypotheses, one of which may be leading at
any given time. If the leading diagnostic hypothesis is
incorrect, distortion could foster overconfidence and un-
due commitment to it (Kostopoulou et al., 2012), paving
the way for diagnostic error and/or inadequate treatment
(Kostopoulou, Mousoulis & Delaney, 2009).
While distortion has been established in medical diag-
nosis (Kostopoulou et al., 2012), little is known about the
specific processes underlying it. Physicians may overes-
timate the extent to which the evidence supports a lead-
ing diagnostic hypothesis and/or underestimate the extent
to which the evidence supports a competing, trailing hy-
pothesis. Much of the distortion literature does not dif-
ferentiate between these two processes. Distortion is typ-
ically conceptualized and measured as the overall advan-
tage afforded a leading alternative (e.g., Russo et al., 1998;
Kostopoulou et al., 2012); thus, the relative contribution of
these two modes of distortion cannot be determined.
Researchers have only recently started exploring this.
While we were engaged in the analysis and interpreta-
tion of the data reported here, two related publications ap-
peared in the literature. Blanchard and colleagues (2014)
and DeKay and colleagues (2014) adapted the tradi-
tional “stepwise evolution of preference” (SEP) paradigm
(Russo et al., 1998) so as to measure distortion separately
for a leading and a trailing alternative. Both identified si-
multaneous “proleader” and “antitrailer” distortion, with
no reliable difference in their magnitudes.
Both of these studies involved lay participants evalu-
ating consumer goods (e.g., backpacks, apartments). Al-
though distortion has been found across populations and
tasks, its properties may vary. For example, Russo and col-
leagues found distortion to be higher among salespersons
than auditors (Russo et al., 2000). Kostopoulou and col-
leagues found distortion in family physicians to be among
the lowest reported in the literature (Kostopoulou et al.,
2012).
We conducted two studies to investigate distortion in the
diagnostic judgments of practicing physicians, where we
measured separately distortion in relation to a leading di-
agnosis and distortion in relation to a competing, trailing
diagnosis. We used the same materials and SEP methodol-
ogy as Kostopoulou et al. (2012), who also studied distor-
tion in physicians’ diagnostic judgments. In the study of
Kostopoulou and colleagues, family physicians read three
medical cases, rating the extent to which every new item
of clinical information supported one diagnostic hypoth-
esis over its competitor. Distortion was measured as the
overall advantage afforded the leading diagnosis. In our
studies, we adapted SEP to our purposes: family physi-
cians rated the extent to which each new item supported
each of the two competing diagnoses separately. Study
1 measured distortion relative to the responses of a sepa-
rate control group (“mean-based” distortion, DeKay et al.,
2011), while Study 2 measured distortion relative to the
participants’ own responses obtained under control con-
ditions on a separate occasion (“personalized” distortion,
DeKay et al., 2011).
2 Study 1
2.1 Aim
To investigate the processes underlying distortion in the
diagnostic judgments of family physicians: distortion in
relation to a leading hypothesis and distortion in relation
to a trailing hypothesis.
2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Participant recruitment
UK family physicians and residents were recruited in per-
son or via email. Participants recruited in person were
identified at medical conferences. Those recruited via
email were identified from a database of family physicians
who had participated in previous studies by the second au-
thor. Each participant received a £10 Amazon voucher as
a token of appreciation.
2.2.2 Materials
We employed three patient scenarios, constructed by
Kostopoulou et al. (2012). They described a patient with
fatigue (which could be due to either diabetes or depres-
sion), a patient with dyspnea (which could be caused by
either chronic lung disease or heart failure) and a patient
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Figure 1: Scales used to collect ratings of the diagnostic
value of cues in the present studies. Participants were re-
quired to place one mark on each scale. The diagnosis
evaluated first was counterbalanced across participants.
Patricia says: "I don’t feel like doing very much in the
evenings, other than watching TV."
How much does this item of
information support a diag-
nosis of depression?
No Strong
support support
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How much does this item of
information support a diag-
nosis of diabetes?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
with chest pain (which could be either musculoskeletal or
cardiac in origin). Each scenario comprised a short intro-
duction (patient name, age and health complaint) followed
by a sequence of cues. Each cue contained information
that could have been obtained through questions to the pa-
tient, physical examination or laboratory tests. Some cues
were neutral, providing equal support for the two compet-
ing diagnoses; other cues were diagnostic, providing sup-
port for one of the two competing diagnoses (Kostopoulou
et al., 2008, 2012). All study materials were presented as
online questionnaires, using Qualtrics.
2.2.3 Procedure
Physicians were randomly assigned to either an experi-
mental or a control condition. Physicians in the experi-
mental group read the three scenarios in a random order.
Each scenario began with a “steer”, i.e., three diagnos-
tic cues providing strong support for one of the two di-
agnoses. For each scenario, half of the physicians were
steered towards diagnosis A while half were steered to-
wards diagnosis B (random assignment). Four neutral
cues were then presented sequentially; each of these pro-
vided equal support for the two competing hypotheses. In
the third scenario only, the neutral cues were followed by
three diagnostic cues, intended to conflict with the initial
steer (“conflicting” cues). These were the same three di-
agnostic cues used to form the “steer” for the opposing
diagnosis; that is, the three cues that were presented so as
to steer one physician towards diagnosis A were the same
three cues that were presented as conflicting information
to a physician steered towards diagnosis B. Therefore, in
the third scenario only, all physicians saw exactly the same
items of information, albeit in different orders.
Participants were required to respond to each item in
turn. After they read the steer, they provided an estimate of
diagnostic likelihood on a 21-point Visual Analogue Scale
(VAS), anchored at “diagnosis A more likely” and “diag-
Figure 2: Scale used to estimate diagnostic likelihood after
1) the steer and 2) the evaluation of each cue. The same
scale was used in the study by Kostopoulou et al. (2012).
Given all the information provided so far, please rate your es-
timated likelihood of the cause of Patricia’s fatigue.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Depression Equally Diabetes
more likely more
likely likely
nosis B more likely”. Participants then assessed the diag-
nostic value of each neutral cue (and each conflicting cue,
in scenario 3) for each of the two competing diagnoses.
The manner in which they did so was the sole difference
between the study by Kostopoulou et al. (2012) and the
present one. In the 2012 study, participants rated the diag-
nostic value of each cue using a single 21-point VAS an-
chored at “favors diagnosis A” and “favors diagnosis B”.
Hence, distortion was measured as the overall advantage
afforded a leading diagnostic hypothesis. In the present
study, participants rated the diagnostic value of each cue
in relation to each diagnosis, using two 11-point VASs an-
chored at “no support” and “strong support” (Figure 1).
Hence, distortion was measured separately for the lead-
ing and the trailing diagnostic hypotheses. Following each
cue evaluation, participants updated their estimate of diag-
nostic likelihood, based on all information seen up to that
point (Figure 2). They therefore provided three estimates
in response to each cue (Figures 1 & 2).
Physicians in the control group evaluated the same cues
as the experimental group. They used the same 11-point
VASs (Figure 3) and therefore provided two ratings per
cue. However, the control group did not have the oppor-
tunity to develop a leading diagnosis that could bias their
cue evaluations (Russo et al., 1998; Kostopoulou et al.,
2012). This was achieved in a number of ways:
1) All cues from the three scenarios were collected and
scrambled, i.e., presented in a random order, different for
each physician.
2) Each cue pertained to a new patient, introduced by
a unique letter rather than a name (e.g., Patient A, Patient
G), a health complaint (fatigue, dyspnea or chest pain) and
minimal demographic information (sex and age).
3) Patient age was varied by a maximum of 4 years
above or below the age specified in the corresponding sce-
nario, to prevent participants from linking patients with
the same health complaint and building a coherent rep-
resentation. An experienced family physician and study
co-author deemed that “. . . such small variations in age
were not clinically significant” (Kostopoulou et al., 2012,
p. 834).
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Figure 3: Excerpt of materials seen by the control group.
Participants were required to place one mark on each
scale. The diagnosis evaluated first was counterbalanced
across participants.
Patient X, a 51 year old female, presents with fatigue for the
past 2 months. The patient says: "I don’t feel like doing very
much in the evenings, other than watching TV."
How much does this item of
information support a diag-
nosis of depression?
No Strong
support support
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How much does this item of
information support a diag-
nosis of diabetes?
No Strong
support support
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Patient C, a 59 year old male, presents with new onset of in-
termittent chest pain. The patient says: "If I take a rest, the
pain usually goes away."
How much does this item of
information support a mus-
culoskeletal diagnosis?
No Strong
support support
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How much does this item
of information support a car-
diac diagnosis?
No Strong
support support
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Patient OE is a 34 year old female presenting with abdominal
pain for the past 3 months. The patient says: "I’ve had really
bad abdominal bloating recently."
How much does this item of
information support a diag-
nosis of irritable bowel syn-
drome?
No Strong
support support
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
How much does this item of
information support a diag-
nosis of celiac disease?
No Strong
support support
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4) Three decoy cues pertaining to entirely different pairs
of diagnoses were included.
5) Participants were never asked to provide estimates of
diagnostic likelihood.
2.2.4 Measuring of distortion
We measured distortion in two ways: the traditional way
that averages cue ratings given by the control group to
produce a point estimate of the “unbiased” rating per cue
(“mean-based” method, DeKay et al., 2011), and a new
way that takes into account the variation in control cue
ratings.
2.2.5 The traditional way of measuring distortion
In most studies of distortion where participants use a sin-
gle scale to rate the cues, distortion of a cue is calculated as
the difference between an experimental participant’s cue
rating and the mean cue rating by the control group. This
difference is then signed as positive or negative depend-
ing on which option was leading just before the experi-
mental participant rated the cue (“leader-signed” distor-
tion, Russo et al., 1998).
In our study, physicians in both the experimental and
control groups gave two ratings per cue, one in relation
to diagnosis A and another in relation to diagnosis B. For
each cue, we averaged the ratings of the control group in
relation to each competing diagnosis, producing two mean
control ratings per cue.
Each physician in the experimental group received two
distortion scores per cue: one score in relation to the di-
agnosis that was leading just before the cue was evaluated
and another score in relation to the diagnosis that was trail-
ing just before the cue was evaluated. The diagnoses that
were leading and trailing at any given time were identi-
fied from the physician’s most recent estimate of diagnos-
tic likelihood (Figure 2).
To calculate distortion in relation to the leading diag-
nosis, we computed the difference between 1) a physi-
cian’s rating of a cue in relation to the leading diagnosis
and 2) the mean control rating of the same cue in rela-
tion to the same diagnosis. A positive score indicated that
the diagnostic value of information was overestimated to
strengthen the leading diagnosis (“proleader distortion”,
Blanchard et al., 2014; DeKay et al., 2014).
To calculate distortion in relation to the trailing diagno-
sis, we computed the difference between 1) a participant’s
rating of a cue in relation to the trailing diagnosis and 2)
the mean control rating of the same cue in relation to the
same diagnosis. We then reversed the sign of the result-
ing difference, so that a positive score indicated that the
diagnostic value of information was distorted to weaken
the trailing diagnosis (“antitrailer distortion”, Blanchard
et al., 2014; DeKay et al., 2014). Thus, positive distortion
scores always indicated distortion in the predicted direc-
tion: strengthening the leading diagnosis and weakening
the trailing diagnosis.
A new way of measuring distortion. Mean-based dis-
tortion does not take into account the error of estimating
the mean of the control group. If measured against an
inflated mean control rating, proleader distortion would
be underestimated and antitrailer distortion overestimated.
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Table 1: Mean-based distortion in relation to the leading and trailing diagnoses in Study 1.
Mean (SD) Length 95% CI t (df), p Effect size (d)
Distortion in relation to the leading diagnosis 0.20 (1.31) 0.54 [−0.07, 0.47] 1.50 (95), 0.14 0.15 (small)
Distortion in relation to the trailing diagnosis 0.89 (1.22) 0.50 [0.64,1.14] 7.17 (95), <0.01 0.73 (med-large)
Similarly, if measured against a diminished mean control
rating, proleader distortion would be overestimated and
antitrailer distortion underestimated.
To measure distortion in a way that accounts for the
variance in the control cue ratings, we ran two 2-level
mixed effects models: one to measure distortion in rela-
tion to the leading diagnosis and another to measure dis-
tortion in relation to the trailing diagnosis. We regressed
the raw cue ratings on the study group (experimental vs.
control), so that ratings cast under experimental conditions
would be compared with ratings cast under control condi-
tions, separately when a diagnosis was leading and when
a diagnosis was trailing.
2.2.6 Sample size
In a linear regression of distortion on the estimated like-
lihood of a leading diagnosis, Kostopoulou et al. (2012)
found that a 1-unit increase in diagnostic likelihood was
associated with a 0.3-unit increase in physicians’ distor-
tion on the next cue (slope = 0.3, p < 0.01). We estimated
that to detect a similar association between diagnostic like-
lihood and distortion (the sum of proleader and antitrailer),
with power of 0.8 and α = 0.05, we would need at least 71
participants in the experimental group. Likewise, the size
of our control group was based on that of Kostopoulou et
al. (2012) (n = 36).
2.3 Results
Of the 197 physicians e-mailed, 95 participated (48%).
We recruited 44 additional participants at conferences, re-
sulting in a final sample of 139 physicians: 50% female,
9% residents in family medicine, 28 to 64 years of age (M
= 39.3, SD = 8.9, median = 36.0), with 0 to 36 years in
family medicine (M = 10.1, SD = 9.5, median = 6.0). De-
mographics were comparable across the experimental (n =
96) and control (n = 43) groups.
2.3.1 Distortion in relation to the leading and trailing
diagnoses
The traditional way of measuring distortion. We av-
eraged distortion in relation to the leading diagnoses
across cues, per physician. We did the same for distor-
tion in relation to the trailing diagnoses. One-sample t
tests revealed that mean distortion in relation to the lead-
ing diagnoses was not significantly different from 0, while
mean distortion in relation to the trailing diagnoses oc-
cupied almost one unit of the cue evaluation scale (Table
1). Paired-samples t tests revealed no reliable differences
in the distortion of neutral vs. diagnostic cues (mean dif-
ference for distortion in relation to the leading diagnoses
= 0.32 [−0.04, 0.68], t(95) = 1.76, p = 0.08, d = 0.18;
mean difference for distortion in relation to the trailing di-
agnoses = 0.07 [−0.27, 0.41], t(95) = 0.38, p = 0.70, d =
0.04).
A new way of measuring distortion. Variation in con-
trol cue ratings was substantial (mean SD = 2.07). Distor-
tion in relation to leading diagnoses was not significant in
the regression model: slope = 0.22 [−0.23, 0.66], p = 0.33.
In contrast, the model that measured distortion in relation
to trailing diagnoses found substantial antitrailer distor-
tion: slope = −1.11 [−1.52, −0.70], p < 0.01. Thus, the
new method of measuring distortion confirmed the find-
ings of the traditional way of measuring distortion.1,2
Individual differences. The two modes of distortion,
each averaged per physician, were reliably different from
one another (mean difference = 0.69 [0.23,1.15], t (95) =
3.01, p < 0.01, d = 0.31). We explored this further us-
ing paired-samples t tests per physician. We identified 17
physicians who displayed reliably more proleader than an-
titrailer distortion, and 31 physicians who displayed the
opposite tendency. The remaining 48 physicians (50% of
1To compare the slopes for proleader and antitrailer distortion di-
rectly, we ran a single mixed effects model that compared raw cue ratings
for the leading diagnosis, the trailing diagnosis, and the control group si-
multaneously. The slopes for proleader and antitrailer distortion were
comparable to those of the separate models (slope for proleader distor-
tion = 0.22 [−0.18, 0.62], p = 0.28; slope for antitrailer distortion =
−1.11 [−1.51, −0.71], p < 0.01), and significantly different from one
another (χ2 (1) = 5.06, p = 0.02). For the comparison of slopes we used
their absolute values.
2Given the nearly significant difference in distortion between neutral
and diagnostic cues in relation to the leading diagnosis, we also measured
distortion on neutral cues only. Antitrailer distortion was significant: M
= 0.90 [0.65, 1.16], t (95) = 6.95, p < 0.01, d = 0.70 in the traditional
analysis; slope = −1.07 [−1.52, −0.63], p < 0.01 in the new analysis.
Proleader distortion approached significance: M = 0.25 [−0.02, 0.51], t
(95) = 1.86, p = 0.07, d = 0.19 in the traditional analysis; slope = 0.40
[−0.05, 0.86], p = 0.08 in the new analysis.
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Table 2: Diagnostic commitment in Study 1.
Chest Pain Dyspnea Fatigue
Same side of diagnostic
VAS at the start and at the
end (i.e. after the neutral
cues were evaluated)
92%* 71%∗ 79%∗
Same side of diagnostic
VAS throughout (from the
start until all neutral cues
were evaluated)
80% 62% 62%
∗ Fisher’s Exact p < 0.01
the sample) did not exhibit significant differences between
the two modes of distortion.
To explore whether the tendency toward proleader vs.
antitrailer distortion was consistent across scenarios, we
calculated each physician’s mean proleader distortion and
mean antitrailer distortion per scenario (excluding con-
flicting cues in the third scenario), and subtracted anti-
trailer from proleader distortion. A positive score for a
scenario would indicate more proleader than antitrailer
distortion, while a negative score would indicate the oppo-
site. Cronbach’s α for the three scores was 0.79, suggest-
ing that the tendency for proleader vs. antitrailer distortion
was consistent for a given physician across scenarios.
2.3.2 Distortion and diagnostic likelihood
We used a 2-level linear regression model with random in-
tercept to investigate whether the estimated likelihood of
the leading diagnosis accounted for the distortion on the
next cue (DeKay et al., 2009; Kostopoulou et al., 2012).
Separate models were created for each mode of distor-
tion. The models used the distortion scores per cue, pair-
ing each with the immediately preceding estimate of di-
agnostic likelihood. In both models, estimated diagnostic
likelihood accounted for distortion on the next cue: slope
= 0.14 [0.09, 0.19], p < 0.01 for distortion in relation to
the leading diagnosis; slope = 0.09 [0.04, 0.13], p < 0.01
for distortion in relation to the trailing diagnosis.
We investigated whether each mode of distortion influ-
enced the final diagnostic estimates in each scenario, after
all the neutral cues had been rated and before any con-
flicting cues were seen in the third scenario (for compa-
rability across scenarios). Table 2 shows the proportion
of physicians who started and finished on the same side
of the diagnostic likelihood VAS. It also shows the pro-
portion of physicians who remained on the same side of
the diagnostic likelihood VAS throughout a scenario. We
excluded participants whose rating on the diagnostic like-
lihood scale was 0 (i.e., equal likelihood), either at the start
or after the neutral cues were seen (n = 11 for chest pain,
n = 19 for dyspnea, n = 15 for fatigue).
To explore the influence of each mode of distortion on
final diagnostic estimates (i.e., estimates after all the neu-
tral cues were seen and evaluated), we conducted a four-
step analysis (DeKay et al., 2014).
1) We averaged per physician:
a. distortion in relation to Diagnosis 1 (D1) when it was
leading,
b. distortion in relation to D1 when it was trailing,
c. distortion in relation to Diagnosis 2 (D2) when it was
leading, and
d. distortion in relation to D2 when it was trailing.
2) We reversed the signs for b and c, so that higher
scores always favored D1.
3) We took the average of a and c (distortion in relation
to leading diagnoses) and the average of b and d (distortion
in relation to trailing diagnoses).
4) We used hierarchical linear regression to assess the
relationship of these two averages with the final diagnostic
likelihood (−10 = “D2 more likely”, 0 = “equally likely”,
10 = “D1 more likely”). We controlled for the diagnostic
steer (counterbalanced across participants) as follows: ini-
tial diagnostic likelihood was the sole predictor in the first
run of the model (block 1) and the two modes of distortion
were added together subsequently (block 2).
Finally, we compared the coefficient for proleader with
that for antitrailer distortion in each scenario, to determine
any differences in their magnitude.
Our findings, presented in Table 3, were consistent
across scenarios. The initial estimate of D1 likelihood was
the strongest determinant of the final estimate of D1 likeli-
hood. However, distortion to favor D1 made a small, inde-
pendent contribution, with significant input from both pro-
leader and antitrailer distortion. In two scenarios, dyspnea
and fatigue, the two modes of distortion had roughly equal
influence upon final judgments: F (1, 90) = 0.02, p = 0.88
for dyspnea; F (1, 91) = 2.44, p = 0.12 for fatigue. The
influence of proleader distortion was significantly weaker
than that of antitrailer distortion in the chest pain scenario:
F (1, 91) = 4.74, p = 0.03.
2.3.3 Final diagnosis in the third scenario
At the start of the third scenario, the steer was success-
ful in installing the intended leading diagnosis in 81 of
the 96 physicians (84%); eight physicians considered the
competing diagnosis more likely (8%), while the remain-
ing seven physicians (7%) considered the two competing
diagnoses equally likely (0-midpoint of the scale). At the
end of the third scenario, after physicians had evaluated
the three cues that opposed the initial steer, 32 considered
the steer as more likely (33%), 52 physicians considered
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Table 3: Associations with final diagnostic likelihood in Study 1.
Chest Pain Dyspnea Fatigue
Initial diagnostic Beta = 0.57 Beta = 0.50 Beta = 0.47
likelihood B = 0.49 [0.37, 0.61] B = 0.32 [0.21, 0.42] B = 0.38 [0.25, 0.50]
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Proleader distortion Beta = 0.16 Beta = 0.25 Beta = 0.27
B = 0.52 [0.20, 0.84] B = 0.68 [0.25, 1.11] B = 0.73 [0.31, 1.16]
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Antitrailer distortion Beta = 0.37 Beta = 0.30 Beta = 0.35
B = 0.99 [0.62, 1.36] B = 0.71 [0.29, 1.14] B = 1.17 [0.67, 1.66]
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Variance explained: 77% 46% 54%
Total F (3, 91) = 105.94 F (3, 90) = 26.97 F (3, 91) = 37.06
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Variance explained: 8% 9% 13%
Distortion F change (2, 91) = 16.50 F change (2, 90) = 8.00 F change (2, 91) = 13.52
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Note: Participants who did not develop a leading diagnosis in a given scenario were excluded from
the analysis (n = 1 for chest pain, n = 2 for dyspnea, n = 1 for fatigue). Conflicting cues in the third
scenario were excluded from the calculations.
Variance explained Total expresses, as a percentage, the Adjusted R Square statistic for the full
model.
Variance explained Distortion expresses, as a percentage, the R Square Change statistic for the
distortion component of the model.
the competing diagnosis more likely (54%), and the re-
maining 12 considered the two diagnoses equally likely
(13%).
3 Discussion
We measured physicians’ distortion of information in re-
lation to a leading and a trailing diagnosis against the
mean ratings of a separate control group. We also mea-
sured distortion using multilevel linear regression that by-
passed the need to use mean control ratings as the base-
line. The two ways of measuring distortion produced con-
sistent findings. On average, we found minimal distortion
to strengthen a leading diagnosis (proleader) but consider-
able distortion to weaken a competing, trailing diagnosis
(antitrailer). However, analysis of proleader and antitrailer
distortion per physician suggested individual differences,
with a minority of physicians displaying predominantly
proleader distortion. The higher the estimated likelihood
of a leading diagnosis, the larger was each mode of distor-
tion on the next cue. Increases in both modes of distortion
were associated with increased final estimates of diagnos-
tic likelihood. At the end of the third scenario, after physi-
cians evaluated cues that conflicted with the initial steer,
only about a third of the sample ended up considering the
steered diagnosis more likely.
4 Study 2
4.1 Introduction
We expect that physicians’ cue ratings are informed by
their unique constellation of medical knowledge and ex-
periences. Therefore, variance resulting from individual
differences in prior knowledge could be wrongfully at-
tributed to distortion. The most valid estimate of distor-
tion in medical diagnosis might thus be a “personalized”
one (DeKay et al., 2011), where each participant’s distor-
tion is measured relative to his/her own baseline ratings of
cues.
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DeKay and colleagues (2011, 2014) compared the per-
sonalized and mean-based measures of distortion directly.
The personalized method did not provide a superior es-
timate: in fact, it was less precise than the mean-based
one (DeKay et al., 2011). However, prior knowledge (or
preference) was unlikely to influence cue evaluation in the
study of DeKay et al. (2011), where undergraduates eval-
uated hypothetical gambles with which they had little or
no experience. In DeKay et al.’s (2014) study, individ-
ual differences in preference for apartment features were
clearly present, but the personalized and mean-based dis-
tortion measures still performed very similarly. Study 2 of
the current article compared the personalized and mean-
based estimates of distortion among physicians, whose
prior knowledge and experience were relevant to the task
at hand.
Study 1 revealed individual differences in the mode of
distortion displayed. On average, physicians displayed
predominantly antitrailer distortion, but a minority dis-
played predominantly proleader distortion. The dominant
mode of distortion was consistent across scenarios. Study
2 tested two potential correlates of proleader and anti-
trailer distortion: the Personal Need for Structure (PNS)
and the Personal Fear of Invalidity (PFI) (Thompson, Nac-
carato, Parker & Moskowitz, 2001). The PNS captures
“. . . the need to create and maintain simple structures”
(Neuberg, Judice &West, 1997, p. 1396; Neuberg & New-
som, 1993). Individuals with high PNS tend to assimilate
incoming information to preexisting or emerging judg-
ments. Therefore, we expected these persons to display
greater distortion. The PFI measures the “. . . fear of mak-
ing judgmental errors” (Neuberg et al., 1997, p. 1404).
Individuals with high PFI tend to display ambivalent at-
titudes and indecisiveness (Neuberg et al., 1997; Thomp-
son et al., 2001). Therefore, we expected them to provide
lower estimates of diagnostic likelihood, which would in
turn reduce the magnitude of distortion. Both scales have
been shown to be valid and reasonably reliable (Thompson
et al., 2001).
Previous attempts to identify personality variables that
moderate distortion have generally proven fruitless. Russo
et al. (1998) found no relationship between distortion and
the Preference for Consistency (Cialdini, Trost & New-
som, 1995) or the Myers-Briggs dimension of judgment,
while Meloy (2000) found distortion to be unrelated to the
Need to Evaluate (Jarvis & Petty, 1996), the Need for Cog-
nitive Closure (Kruglanski, Webster & Klem, 1993; Web-
ster & Kruglanski, 1994; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996)
and the PNS. However, these studies measured distortion
as the total advantage afforded a leading alternative. Study
2 measured distortion in relation to competing diagnoses
separately. It was therefore the first to explore whether
personality variables might moderate mode of distortion
(proleader and antitrailer) rather than total distortion.
4.2 Aims
1. To compare the mean-based and personalized esti-
mates of distortion, in participants with task-related
prior knowledge.
2. To explore potential sources of individual differences
in the mode and magnitude of distortion, specifically,
the Personal Need for Structure and Personal Fear of
Invalidity.
Methods
4.2.1 Participant recruitment
We invited by e-mail UK family physicians and residents
who had taken part in previous studies by the second au-
thor. Each participant received a £35 Amazon voucher as
a token of appreciation. The voucher was of greater value
than in Study 1, as participants were required to partic-
ipate on two separate occasions and complete two addi-
tional questionnaires (PNS and PFI). We did not recruit
physicians who had taken part in Study 1.
4.2.2 Materials and procedure
Only two changes were made to the materials and pro-
cedure of Study 1. Firstly, the study followed a within-
participant design. Each participant completed both study
conditions (experimental and control), in a counterbal-
anced order and with an interval of one month between
conditions. The one-month interval was intended to re-
move potential carry-over effects (DeKay et al., 2011).
Secondly, after a participant had completed both condi-
tions, s/he was asked to complete two measures of indi-
vidual differences: Neuberg and Newsom’s (1993) abbre-
viated version of the Personal Need for Structure scale
(PNS, Thompson et al., 2001) and the Personal Fear of
Invalidity scale (PFI, Thompson et al., 2001). Participants
indicated their agreement with each of the 11 items of the
PNS scale (e.g., I don’t like situations that are uncertain)
and each of the 14 items of the PFI scale (e.g., I tend to
struggle with most decisions). Agreement was rated on a
six-point scale (1 = “strongly disagree” to 6 = “strongly
agree”). The order in which the PFI and PNS scales were
completed was counterbalanced across participants.
4.2.3 Calculation of distortion
The two modes of distortion (in relation to the leading and
the trailing diagnoses) were calculated relative to the par-
ticipant’s own ratings provided under control conditions
on a separate occasion (“personalized distortion”). In an
attempt to replicate the results of Study 1 with a new sam-
ple of physicians, we also measured distortion relative to
the mean ratings that the whole Study 2 sample provided
under control conditions (“mean-based distortion”).
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Table 4: Personalized and mean-based estimates of proleader and antitrailer distortion in Study 2.
Mean (SD) Length 95% CI t (df), p Effect size (d)
Proleader distortion (personalized) 0.09 (1.24) 0.52 [−0.17, 0.36] 0.69 (84), 0.49 0.07 (small)
Antitrailer distortion (personalized) 0.82 (1.06) 0.45 [0.60, 1.05] 7.17 (84), <0.01 0.77 (med-large)
Proleader distortion (mean-based) 0.19 (1.36) 0.58 [−0.10, 0.48] 1.30 (84), 0.20 0.14 (small)
Antitrailer distortion (mean-based) 0.95 (1.24) 0.54 [0.68, 1.22] 7.03 (84), <0.01 0.77 (med-large)
4.3 Results
Of the 187 UK family physicians e-mailed, 91 participated
(49%), a response rate almost identical to that in Study
1 (48%). Two were excluded from the analyses because
they did not complete the second questionnaire. A further
two were excluded because we subsequently discovered
that they had participated in Study 1. Finally, two more
were excluded because they got in touch to let us know
that they had misunderstood the response scales. Our final
sample consisted of 85 family physicians: 46% female,
1% residents, 25 to 63 years of age (M = 40.5, SD = 8.7,
median = 37.0), with 0 to 35 years in family medicine (M =
11.3, SD = 9.1, median = 8.00). The sample was therefore
comparable to that of Study 1, except that it contained a
lower proportion of trainees (1% vs. 9%).
4.3.1 Distortion in relation to the leading and trailing
diagnoses
The two modes of personalized distortion (personalized:
calculated relative to each physician’s own control rat-
ings) were each averaged across cues per physician. One-
sample t tests revealed that personalized distortion in re-
lation to the leading diagnoses was close to zero, while
personalized distortion in relation to the trailing diagnoses
was nearly one scale unit (Table 4). Personalized distor-
tion did not differ between neutral and diagnostic cues
(mean difference for proleader distortion = 0.31 [−0.03,
0.66], t (84) = 1.80, p = 0.08, d = 0.19; mean difference
for antitrailer distortion = 0.10 [−0.29, 0.48], t (84) = 0.50,
p = 0.62, d = 0.06).
The two modes of mean-based distortion (mean-based:
calculated relative to the mean ratings of the Study 2
sample cast under control conditions) were each averaged
across cues per physician. As in Study 1, one-sample t
tests revealed that mean-based distortion in relation to the
leading diagnoses approached zero, while mean-based dis-
tortion relation to the trailing diagnoses approached one
unit on the cue evaluation scale (Table 4). As in Study 1,
mean-based distortion did not differ between neutral and
diagnostic cues (mean difference for proleader distortion
= 0.29 [−0.08, 0.65], t (84) = 1.56, p = 0.12, d = 0.17;
mean difference for antitrailer distortion = 0.11 [−0.26,
0.47], t (84) = 0.58, p = 0.57, d = 0.06). Thus, Study 2
replicated the findings of Study 1 in terms of mean-based
distortion in relation to leading and trailing alternatives.
Furthermore, the two different methods of measuring dis-
tortion (mean-based and personalized) produced very sim-
ilar estimates of distortion magnitude and variance (Table
4).3
We compared the mean-based and personalized distor-
tion estimates formally, using two paired-samples t tests,
one per mode of distortion. Each t test compared the
mean-based and personalized estimates of distortion for
each physician. We found no statistical differences be-
tween the mean-based and personalized estimates for ei-
ther mode of distortion (mean difference for proleader dis-
tortion = 0.10 [−0.17, 0.37], t (84) = 0.73, p = 0.47, d
= 0.08; mean difference for antitrailer distortion = 0.12
[−0.12, 0.37], t (84) = 0.99, p = 0.33, d = 0.10).
As in Study 1, the two distortion modes were reliably
different from each other, whether measured using the
mean-based method (mean difference = 0.76 [0.26, 1.25],
paired-samples t (84) = 3.03, p < 0.01, d = 0.33) or the
personalized method (mean difference = 0.73 [0.31, 1.16],
paired samples t (84) = 3.42, p < 0.01, d = 0.37). With the
mean-based method, we identified 18 physicians (21%)
who exhibited predominantly proleader distortion (18%
in Study 1) and 30 physicians (35%) exhibiting predom-
inantly antitrailer distortion (32% in Study 1). With the
personalized method, we identified fewer physicians in
each group: 9 physicians (11%) exhibited predominantly
proleader distortion and 23 physicians (27%) exhibited
predominantly antitrailer distortion. As in Study 1, the
dominant mode of distortion was consistent across scenar-
ios: Cronbach’s α = 0.81 for mean-based estimates (Cron-
bach’s α = 0.79 in Study 1), and Cronbach’s α = 0.67 for
personalized estimates.
3When we reran the analyses for neutral cues only, antitrailer distor-
tion was significant by both the personalized and mean-based methods
of measurement (personalized M = 0.84 [0.60, 1.07], t (84) = 7.07, p <
.01, d = 0.77; mean-based M = 0.95 [0.67, 1.23], t (84) = 6.80, p < 0.01,
d = 0.74). Proleader distortion was not significant by either method of
measurement (personalized M = 0.16 [−0.13, 0.44], t (84) = 1.10, p =
0.27, d = 0.12; mean-based M = 0.25 [−0.06, 0.55], t (84) = 1.62, p =
0.11, d = 0.18).
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Table 5: Diagnostic commitment in Study 2.
Chest Pain Dyspnea Fatigue
Same side of diagnostic
VAS and at the end (i.e.
after the neutral cues were
evaluated)
87%∗ 76%∗ 83%∗
Same side of diagnostic
VAS throughout (from the
start until all neutral cues
were evaluated)
81% 66% 70%
∗ Fisher’s Exact p < 0.01.
4.3.2 Distortion and diagnostic likelihood
As in Study 1, the estimated likelihood of the diagnosis
that was leading at any one time was significantly and pos-
itively associated with both modes of personalized distor-
tion on the next cue: slope = 0.14 [0.08, 0.20], p < 0.01 for
proleader, and slope = 0.10 [0.05, 0.16], p < 0.01 for an-
titrailer distortion. Almost identical slopes were obtained
for mean-based distortion: slope = 0.14 [0.08, 0.20], p <
0.01 for proleader, and slope = 0.10 [0.04, 0.15], p < 0.01
for antitrailer distortion.
Table 5 shows the proportion of physicians who started
and finished on the same side of the diagnostic likelihood
VAS. It also shows the proportion of physicians who re-
mained on the same side of the diagnostic likelihood VAS
throughout a scenario.
We excluded participants whose initial and/or final rat-
ing on the diagnostic likelihood scale was 0 (i.e., equal
likelihood) (n = 11 for chest pain, n = 18 for dyspnea, n =
19 for fatigue).
As in Study 1, we used hierarchical linear regression to
assess the influence of the two modes of distortion on final
estimates of diagnostic likelihood (after all neutral cues
but before the conflicting cues in the third scenario), con-
trolling for initial estimates. Separate models were created
for personalized and mean-based distortion. Conflicting
cues in the third scenario were excluded from the calcula-
tions. The results are reported in Table 6.
By and large, the personalized and mean-based mod-
els resemble those of Study 1: initial diagnostic likelihood
had the strongest influence on final diagnostic likelihood,
with distortion making a smaller, independent contribu-
tion. In two scenarios, dyspnea and fatigue, both modes of
distortion were associated with final likelihood estimates,
with roughly equal contributions thereto: personalized F
(1, 80) = 2.20, p = 0.14, and mean-based F (1, 80) = 0.00,
p = 0.94 for dyspnea; personalized F (1, 80) = 1.78, p
= 0.19, and mean-based F (1, 80) = 0.18, p = 0.67 for
fatigue. No association was observed for proleader dis-
tortion in the chest pain scenario, where the contribution
of antitrailer distortion was significantly greater: person-
alized F (1, 80) = 7.64, p < 0.01, and mean-based F (1,
80) = 11.45, p < 0.01.
4.3.3 Final diagnosis in the third scenario
At the start of the third scenario, the steer was successful
in installing the intended leading diagnosis in 74 of the
85 physicians (87%); five physicians considered the com-
peting diagnosis more likely (6%), while six physicians
considered the two competing diagnoses equally likely
(7%). At the end of the third scenario, after physicians
had evaluated the three cues that opposed the initial steer,
30 considered the steer as more likely (35%); 46 consid-
ered the competing diagnosis as more likely (54%), and
the remaining nine physicians considered the two diag-
noses equally likely (11%).
4.3.4 Individual differences measures
Responses to items of the Personal Need for Structure
scale (PNS) were summed per participant. The mean PNS
score was 41.4 (SD = 8.4, range 21 to 61). PNS did not
correlate with either mode of distortion, whether calcu-
lated using the personalized method (leader distortion r =
0.04, p = 0.74; trailer distortion r =−0.06, p = 0.59) or the
mean-based method (leader distortion r = 0.08, p = 0.48;
trailer distortion r = -0.11, p = 0.30).
Responses to items of the Personal Fear of Invalidity
(PFI) measure were also summed per participant. The
mean PFI score was 45.4 (SD = 9.0, range 24 to 69).
We found no significant relationship between PFI scores
and initial estimates of diagnostic likelihood (Pearson r
= −0.06, p = 0.57). As such, we no longer expected PFI
score to correlate with either mode of distortion: personal-
ized proleader distortion r =−0.06 (p = 0.58), mean-based
r = −0.02 (p = 0.88); personalized antitrailer distortion r
= 0.06 (p = 0.62), mean-based r = −0.09 (p = 0.40).
4.4 Discussion
Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1, using both a
personalized and a mean-based method for calculating dis-
tortion. On average, physicians displayed minimal distor-
tion to strengthen a leading diagnosis and substantial dis-
tortion to weaken a trailing diagnosis. Again, we found
individual differences in the mode of distortion, with a mi-
nority of physicians displaying predominantly proleader
distortion. As in Study 1, the higher the estimated likeli-
hood of a leading diagnosis, the larger was each mode of
distortion on the next cue. An increase in either mode of
distortion to favor one diagnosis tended to increase final
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Table 6: Associations with final diagnostic likelihood in Study 2.
Chest Pain Dyspnea Fatigue
Personalized
Initial diagnostic Beta = 0.59 Beta = 0.55 Beta = 0.52
likelihood B = 0.53 [0.36, 0.69] B = 0.39 [0.27, 0.50] B = 0.40 [0.29, 0.51]
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Proleader distortion Beta = 0.00 Beta = 0.23 Beta = 0.29
B = 0.00 [−0.46, 0.46] B = 0.67 [0.20, 1.14] B = 1.02 [0.52, 1.53]
p > 0.99 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Antitrailer distortion Beta = 0.29 Beta = 0.36 Beta = 0.35
B = 0.83 [0.30, 1.37] B = 1.07 [0.56, 1.59] B = 1.53 [0.90, 2.16]
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Variance explained: 63% 56% 59%
Total F (3, 80) = 48.96 F(3, 80) = 35.50 F (3, 80) = 41.54
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Variance explained: 5% 10% 17%
Distortion F change (2, 80) = 5.20 F change (2, 80) = 9.33 F change (2, 80) = 17.75
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Mean-based
Initial diagnostic Beta = 0.46 Beta = 0.54 Beta = 0.46
likelihood B = 0.41 [0.26, 0.56] B = 0.38 [0.27, 0.49] B = 0.35 [0.24, 0.46]
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Proleader distortion Beta = 0.09 Beta = 0.34 Beta = 0.42
B = 0.31 [−0.13, 0.74] B = 1.00 [0.52, 1.48] B = 1.28 [0.86, 1.69]
p = 0.17 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Antitrailer distortion Beta = 0.44 Beta = 0.37 Beta = 0.34
B = 1.30 [0.82, 1.78] B = 0.99 [0.52, 1.46] B = 1.16 [0.69, 1.62]
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Variance explained: 70% 58% 65%
Total F (3, 80) = 64.43 F (3, 80) = 38.63 F (3, 80) = 51.78
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Variance explained: 11% 12% 23%
Distortion F change (2, 80) = 14.44 F change (2, 80) = 11.82 F change (2, 80) = 26.42
p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Note: Participants who did not develop a leading diagnosis in a given scenario were excluded from
the analysis (n = 1 for chest pain, n = 1 for dyspnea, n = 1 for fatigue).
Variance explained Total expresses, as a percentage, the Adjusted R Square statistic for the full model.
Variance explained Distortion expresses, as a percentage, the R Square Change statistic for the distor-
tion component of the model.
Shaded cells denote departures from the findings of Study 1.
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estimates of its likelihood. This association was consis-
tent across all three scenarios for antitrailer but not for pro-
leader distortion. As in Study 1, at the end of the third sce-
nario, after physicians evaluated cues that conflicted with
the initial steer, only about a third of the sample ended up
considering the steered diagnosis more likely.
Despite the expected relevance of prior knowledge to
the task at hand, the personalized method for measuring
distortion was statistically equivalent to the mean-based
method. Neither mode of distortion correlated with Per-
sonal Need for Structure or Personal Fear of Invalidity.
5 General Discussion
In two studies, using two different samples of family
physicians and two different methods of measuring pre-
decisional information distortion in medical diagnosis,
we divided distortion to its potential constituent modes:
strengthening a leading diagnostic hypothesis or weak-
ening a competing, trailing hypothesis. On average, we
found consistent evidence for distortion to weaken a trail-
ing hypothesis but not to strengthen a leading hypothesis.
Only a minority of physicians engaged predominantly in
proleader distortion. Physicians’ tendency to engage in
one or the other mode of distortion was consistent across
clinical scenarios. We explored two potential sources of
individual differences, namely, Personal Need for Struc-
ture and Personal Fear of Invalidity. Consistent with pre-
vious research (Russo et al., 1998; Meloy, 2000; Russo et
al., 2000), personality measures were not related to distor-
tion.
In both studies, proleader and antitrailer distortion had
similar effects upon final diagnostic judgments: an in-
crease in either mode of distortion to favor a diagnosis was
associated with increased final estimates of its likelihood.
The influence of proleader distortion seemed weaker and
less consistent across scenarios than that of antitrailer dis-
tortion, though the difference was significant for only one
scenario in one study. Nonetheless, to the extent that pro-
leader distortion occurred, it displayed the expected rela-
tions with emerging and final estimates of diagnostic like-
lihood (DeKay et al., 2014).
Two other research groups, entirely independently and
almost simultaneously with our studies, used similar
methods to investigate the different modes of distor-
tion among lay people choosing consumer goods. They
found evidence for both proleader and antitrailer distor-
tion, which were of similar magnitude (Blanchard et al.,
2014; DeKay et al., 2014).
The inconsistency with our findings could suggest that
the processes underlying information distortion are spe-
cific to the study population and task (DeKay et al., 2014).
There are plausible reasons why physicians might dis-
tort information to weaken a trailing diagnostic alternative
rather than strengthen a leading one. Firstly, physicians
are trained to generate multiple diagnostic hypotheses (a
set of “differentials”) for the presenting problem. Sub-
sequent information search aims to narrow down the set
by excluding hypotheses rather than simply confirming a
leading hypothesis (Elstein, Shulman & Sprafka, 1978),
though the extent to which physicians do this in practice
may vary. If their approach is indeed to exclude rather than
confirm, then distorting information to weaken a trailing
hypothesis may be more beneficial than distorting infor-
mation to strengthen a leading one. If antitrailer distortion
is sufficient in helping physicians to exclude the compet-
ing diagnosis, then they may not need to engage in pro-
leader distortion as well.
Meloy and Russo (2004) found that distortion (concep-
tualized and measured as a single process) increased when
there was a match between decision strategy (select vs. re-
ject alternatives) and valence of alternatives (positive vs.
negative): it was greatest when participants were required
to select one of two positive alternatives or reject one of
two negative alternatives. Their findings demonstrate that
decision strategy can affect the magnitude of distortion;
therefore, it may also affect the mode of distortion. Fur-
ther research could explore the possibility that physicians’
predominant diagnostic strategy is responsible for the pre-
dominant mode of distortion found in our studies.
Secondly, the consequences of a misdiagnosis can be
severe, arguably more severe than the consequences of se-
lecting an inferior consumer item. Physicians may thus be
prudent in evaluating diagnostic hypotheses. In our stud-
ies, this may influence their cue ratings within the diagnos-
tic task (experimental condition) and not their ratings of
random and seemingly unrelated cues (control condition).
A conservative approach to the diagnostic task would cur-
tail proleader but not antitrailer distortion. Future work
could explore whether physicians’ perceived risk, inherent
in the diagnostic task, is responsible for the predominant
mode of distortion found in our studies.
Our findings have implications for theories of cognitive
consistency, which suggest that information is distorted to
maximize consistency between previously observed evi-
dence, hypotheses and newly arriving evidence. As both
modes of distortion can work to increase consistency,
these accounts would predict the occurrence of both. The
present findings pose a challenge to these accounts, call-
ing for more research into the factors that might encourage
one mode of distortion over another.
We note a difference between our findings on the final
diagnosis in the third scenario and those of Kostopoulou
et al. (2012). Across both studies reported here, 34% of
physicians considered the steer as the most likely diagno-
sis after they evaluated the conflicting cues, in contrast to
49% reported by Kostopoulou and colleagues. Further-
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more, 12% of physicians across both our studies consid-
ered the two competing diagnoses equally likely at the end
of the third scenario, in contrast to 6% of physicians in
the 2012 study. In summary, more physicians changed
their diagnosis, and more gave the “normative” response
of equal likelihood—normative because the net informa-
tion in the third scenario (comprising steer cues, neu-
tral cues, and conflicting cues) favored neither diagnosis.
As the only methodological difference between the 2012
study and our two studies consists of the different cue eval-
uation scales (comparative vs. separate), this seems the
most likely source of the different findings: the separate
scales may have forced physicians to recognize evidence-
based support for the opposing diagnosis at the end of
the scenario, making it hard to dismiss. Although it is
tempting to suggest that the separate scales operated akin
to a “consider-the-opposite” debiasing strategy (Larrick,
2004), most physicians did not become more accurate but
simply demonstrated a recency effect: switching to the op-
posite side of the diagnostic scale was more common than
judgments of equal likelihood, suggesting that physicians
placed more weight on the final cues. Nevertheless, judg-
ments of equal diagnostic likelihood were somewhat more
common than in the 2012 study, providing some hope that
forced consideration of two possible outcomes could im-
prove physicians’ diagnostic judgments.
We employed and compared two different methods for
measuring distortion in physicians’ diagnostic judgments:
a traditional “mean-based” method (Study 1) and a “per-
sonalized” method that has rarely been used (Study 2).
In agreement with previous research (DeKay et al., 2011,
2014), they returned comparable results. This lends no
support to the hypothesis that a personalized approach
would outperform a mean-based one, when prior knowl-
edge and experience are relevant to the task at hand. The
logistics of following up participants, in our case physi-
cians, to obtain their responses on a second occasion,
while ensuring a time interval that reduces the likelihood
of carry-over effects, are hard to achieve. Therefore, the
mean-based method that relies on a separate control group
offers an easier and equally valid alternative. However,
the mean-based method is based on averaging the cue rat-
ings of the control group; this ignores the error around
these ratings, which could result in erroneous estimates of
distortion. To address this, we developed a new strategy
for analyzing SEP data. We used multilevel regression to
compare cue ratings cast under experimental vs. control
conditions, thus taking into account the variation in con-
trol group ratings. This analysis returned results consis-
tent with the mean-based approach. This analytical strat-
egy could be used to supplement and validate mean-based
findings in future studies.
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